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The expressivist objection to prenatal testing is acknowledged as a signiﬁcant critique of prenatal testing
practices most commonly advanced by disability rights supporters. Such writers argue that prenatal
testing and selective termination practices are objectionable as they express disvalue not only of the
foetus being tested, but also of disabled people as a whole, by focusing exclusively on the disabling trait.
While the objection has been widely critiqued on the basis of its theoretical incoherence, this paper
highlights the way in which it, nevertheless, is a signiﬁcant mediator in decisions around the use of
reproductive genetic technologies. By drawing on 41 in-depth qualitative interviews (drawn from a
sample of 61) conducted in the UK between 2007 and 2009 with families and individuals living with a
genetic disease, Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA), this paper highlights the ways in which expressivist
objections feature prominently in the reproductive decisions of families living with SMA and the sig-
niﬁcant emotional burden they represent. While the literature on the expressivist objection has focused
on the reproductive decisions of those undergoing prenatal testing for a condition of which they have
little (or no) prior knowledge, the context of intimate familial relationships and extensive experience
with the tested-for condition fundamentally alters the nature and impact of expressivist objections
within families living with an inheritable condition. By focussing on the reproductive decisions of
families living with SMA and their strategic management of the expressivist objection, this paper will
address the call, made primarily by disability rights supporters, for ‘experientially based’ (as opposed to
medical) information about the tested-for disability to be made available to would-be parents consid-
ering selective termination. It will be argued that parents’ experiential knowledge of the tested-for
disability can, in fact, amplify expressivist objections to prenatal testing, and thus paradoxically
constrain, rather than facilitate, reproductive decisions.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
As the capacities of reproductive genetic technologies have
expanded in recent years, so too have the number and nature of
reproductive decisions facing would-be parents. While such tech-
nological advancements have been heralded as increasing the
reproductive autonomy of such parents, the ways in which these
decisions are actually made and experienced have come under
scrutiny by researchers, who have problematized the notion of
‘choice’ in which the technologies are couched, instead pointing to
the potentially constraining effects of the technologies (Lippman,
1991). The so-called ‘expressivist objection’ has been amongst
such critiques of prenatal testing. The term ‘expressivist objection’.
r Ltd. This is an open access article(hereon referred to as the ‘EO’) was coined by Buchanan (1996) and
refers to:
The claim.that.the commitment to developing modes of
intervention to correct, ameliorate, or prevent genetic defects
expresses (and presupposes) negative, extremely damaging
judgements about the value of disabled persons.
(Buchanan, 1996: 28)
As such, the EO, as a critique of genetic testing practices, has
been most often advanced by disability rights supporters (e.g.
Parens and Asch, 2000). Such disability rights supporters have
questioned prenatal testing and screening practices (and the sub-
sequent offer of selective termination of pregnancies where genetic
differences are detected) on the basis that they not only express a
negative valuation of the foetus being tested, but also of the lives ofunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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2000; Saxton, 2000). Following this argument, the selective
termination of a pregnancy is considered objectionable on the
grounds that the particular trait (the disability) comes to represent
the entire foetus, rending immaterial the complexity of all its other
traits (Asch, 2000; Saxton, 1997).
While the theoretical coherence of the EO, and in particular its
claim that prenatal testing practices are capable of ‘expressing’ any
message, has been called into question by various scholars, both
within and without the disability rights community (Shakespeare,
2006), there remains a lack of empirical evidence exploring its
impact, particularly amongst people with disabilities (Madeo et al.,
2011: 1779). A select number of studies have explored the attitudes
of people with the inheritable disabilities to genetic testing (e.g.
Middleton et al., 1998; Gollust et al., 2003), and more recently, re-
searchers have considered how the EO may be shaped by, and
managed within, the broader context of the disabled person’s
family, and familial experiences with the condition (Barlevy et al.,
2012; Raspberry et al., 2011; Helbig et al., 2010; Kelly, 2009).
While critics have argued that prenatal testing and termination
decisions are usually made in the private sphere and, as such, are
incapable of communicating negative messages to disabled people
(Murphy, 2011), families can be described as arenas of ‘reproductive
accountability’ and ‘public’ reproductive decision-making (Burgess
and D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001). They are sites in which repro-
ductive decisions may be subject to family scrutiny, and where
there can be a (felt) need to justify decisions taken (Downing, 2005;
Cox, 2003). Moreover, disabled people and their families usually
approach genetic testing decisions equipped with extensive
‘experiential knowledge’ (Abel and Browner, 1998) about the con-
dition being tested for (Kelly, 2009; Raspberry et al., 2011). This
experiential knowledge, as well as the familial context of repro-
ductive decision-making fundamentally alters the nature and po-
wer of the perceived messages expressed by prenatal testing
technologies. Yet, a clear distinction between this context and that
of testing decisions made by the general population with no prior
knowledge of the tested-for condition has not been widely
acknowledged within the EO literature, in spite of the different
implications these scenarios have for experiences of the EO. Indeed,
the experiences and views of disabled people and their families
living with an inheritable condition have a lot to offer debates
around the EO.Where this issue has been explored in the literature,
the focus of the studies has either exclusively been on those in-
dividuals diagnosed with the condition themselves (e.g. Helbig
et al., 2010), or their family members (e.g. Raspberry et al., 2011;
Kelly, 2009) with very few studies addressing both (e.g. Barlevy
et al., 2012). Consequently, the question of how differing ways of
knowing genetic disease inform reproductive decision-making and
perceptions of the EO within families has been hitherto neglected.
Such an analysis can address the question of how differing levels of
experiential knowledge of the condition being tested for can impact
on perceptions of the expressive potential of testing decisions, and
add to policy debates regarding the value of such knowledge in
prenatal testing decisions.
This paper will address the above outlined gap in the literature
by drawing on an in-depth interview study (61 interviews with 59
participants) with people living with an inheritable condition,
Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA) in their family (Boardman, 2010).
Through the accounts of a sub-sample (n ¼ 41) of these partici-
pants, I will argue that while the theoretical basis of the EO may be
disputed, its existence and ‘felt presence’ amongst families living
with SMA signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the way they approach- and
manage- prenatal testing decisions. For such families, the EO not
only has a signiﬁcant- and sometimes burdensome-emotional
impact, it was also described as having a constraining effect onreproductive decision-making, which had to be carefully
negotiated.2. The expressivist objection
Disability rights supporters have been amongst those who have
most passionately advanced the EO as a way to critique the
discriminatory attitudes and beliefs they deem to underpin pre-
natal testing practices as well as the messages they perceive to be
sent by them to disabled people (Parens and Asch, 2000; Saxton,
2000; Wendell, 1996). In particular, disability rights supporters
have critiqued the incompatibility of prenatal testing technologies
and the practices surrounding them with the unconditional
acceptance of children, irrespective of their genetic traits. To test for
disabling traits in the foetus, and then to base selective termination
decisions upon this information, is, according to Asch (2000), to
allow the disabling trait to ‘trump’ all other (as yet unknown)
characteristics of the foetus. For many disabled people, this pri-
oritising of disability over and above all other traits is echoed in
their daily experiences in a profoundly disablist society:
As with discrimination more generally, with prenatal diagnosis
a single trait stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the
whole. With both discrimination and prenatal diagnosis, no-
body ﬁnds out about the rest. The tests send the message that
there’s no need to ﬁnd out about the rest.
(Asch, 2000:13)
For disability rights supporters, the medical profession (inad-
vertently or otherwise) reinforces and recycles these negative
messages through the processes of prenatal diagnosis and selective
termination by counselling prospective parents (following a posi-
tive prenatal diagnosis) only on the medical complications associ-
ated with that disability, while usually ill-equipped to offer insight
into the daily realities of life with that particular disability, as
Williams et al. (2002) demonstrated in relation to Down’s Syn-
drome counselling. For feminist writers as well, the very existence
and consequent routinisation of prenatal testing technologies
suggests an implicit responsibility to use them (and thereby to test
and terminate affected foetuses) (Lippman, 1991; Markens et al.,
2010; Clarke, 1991), potentially making it harder for those parents
who wish to continue with an affected pregnancy to justify their
decision as ‘responsible’ (Barlevy et al., 2012: 36).
These critiques of prenatal testing and screening practices,
however, have not been universally accepted. Within the ﬁeld of
disability studies itself, the EO has come under harsh scrutiny and
there is an acknowledgement that the EO is not supported by the
whole of the disability community, many of whom see the EO as an
over-simpliﬁcation of their diverse views on this topic. However,
writers such as Shakespeare (2006) have argued that to assume
that prospective parents wish to terminate pregnancies affected by
disability primarily on the basis of ignorant, prejudiced or other-
wise negative attitudes towards disability is to simplify what are
often highly complex and emotionally charged decisions. Indeed it
is not, Shakespeare (2006) points out, a contradiction to both
terminate a pregnancy affected by disability (for example, if a
person feels that they could not provide the additional resources
required to raise a disabled child), and to simultaneously uphold
respectful and supportive views of disabled people within society.
Indeed, for many disability rights supporters, the concerns of EO
proponents with the decision-making processes of prospective
parents and the ‘messages’ these decisions are deemed to send not
only viliﬁes would-be parents but also diverts attention away from
the social and political context in which reproductive genetic
Table 1
The relationship of participants to diagnosed member, gender and number spontaneously mentioning the expressivist objection during interview out of whole sample n ¼ 61.
Participants Numbers Gender Mentioned EO
Female Male
Diagnosed with SMA 25 21 4 19 (76%)
Sibling of person with SMA, without SMA themselves 7 4 3 5 (71%)
Parent of person diagnosed with SMA 24 21 3 16 (67%)
Grandparent of person diagnosed with SMA 1 1 0 0 (0%)
Son or daughter of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1 0 (0%)
Partner or spouse of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1 1 (50%)
Totals 61 49 12 41 (67%)
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2006).
In spite of these debates surrounding the EO, there remains a
notable lack of empirical evidence exploring its conceptualisation
and impact amongst those who use prenatal testing technologies,
as well as amongst disabled people themselves.While other studies
have demonstrated the existence of a philosophical concept
through empirical data e.g. Katz Rothman’s exploration of the
‘tentative pregnancy’ (1986), relatively few exist around the EO. A
recent attempt to ground the EO in empirical data has been made
by Klein (2011) who used data on themedical profession’s handling
of prenatal testing and termination practices to conceptually
delineate the EO. However, the views of would-be parents and/or
disabled people were not included in this empirical exploration.
Indeed, many writers on the EO appear to have in mind testing
decisions made by people with no prior experience of the condition
being tested for, with little attention paid to the families living
closely with that condition (who are also the intended users of
prenatal testing technologies) and in spite of the acknowledged
signiﬁcance of ‘experiential knowledge’ to prenatal testing de-
cisions more broadly (Etchegary et al., 2008; Cox, 2003; Abel and
Browner, 1998; Markens, 2010; Katz Rothman, 1986; Rapp et al.,
2001; Lippman, 1999). Moreover, disabled people often appear
within the literature on the EO primarily as the recipients of the
negative messages sent by prenatal testing as opposed to the pro-
spective parents making active decisions about technology usage in
their own reproductive decisions. This is in spite of media stories
and reﬂective accounts suggesting that the EO is indeed a signiﬁ-
cant consideration for many disabled people (e.g. Barford, 2011;
Atkinson, 2008; Boardman, 2011).
This paper will address some of these shortcomings of the EO
literature by presenting in-depth interview data from a sample of
41 participants either diagnosed with, or with a family member
diagnosed with, the genetic neuromuscular condition, SMA. The
study explored participants’ conceptualisations of their genetic risk
and attitudes to reproductive decision-making. While the EO was
not speciﬁcally asked about within the interview schedule, data
pertaining to the objection emerged spontaneously within partic-
ipants’ accounts and it is these data that will be presented.3. Spinal Muscular Atrophy and reproductive genetics
After Cystic Fibrosis, SMA is themost common (potentially fatal)
autosomal recessively inherited condition in the UK (Dreesen et al.,
1998). It is a neuromuscular condition characterised by degenera-
tion of the anterior horn cells of the spinal cord leading to gener-
alised, and often severe, muscle weakness. SMA has been sub-
categorised into three distinct clinical ‘types’ (IeIII) with different
presentations, ages of onset, severity of muscle weakness and
prognosis (ranging from early infantile death in the case of type I to
late onset muscle weakness in adulthood in type III). All infants
with Type I SMA, and some people with Types II and III SMA,require respiratory support (either through a ventilator or BiPaP
machine) due to weakness of the muscles used to support
breathing. All people diagnosed with SMA are at risk of complica-
tions from chest infections due to this compromised respiratory
function. Most people with Type II SMA are full time wheelchair
users from early childhood and commonly experience spinal cur-
vature and joint contractures (usually requiring surgical correction
and intensive physiotherapy). People diagnosed with Type III SMA
may remain ambulant up until the third decade of life when a
wheelchair usually becomes necessary. In spite of these catego-
risations into types, however, the boundaries of the diagnoses of
SMA arewidely contestedwithin themedical community and there
is a vast overlap in symptoms between them (Dubowitz, 1991,
2008).
It is estimated that one in forty people in the general population
are carriers of the deleted SMN1 gene thought to cause SMA (Wirth,
2000). For each pregnancy, two carrier parents have a 25% chance
of having a child with SMA and a 50% chance of having a child who
will be an asymptomatic carrier. Both prenatal testing and Pre-
Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) are licensed for use in the
UK for SMA, and relatives of a person diagnosed with SMA (and
their partners) can undergo carrier testing to assess their risks of
transmitting it.
While prenatal testing is available for SMA, the test cannot
accurately predict the type (and consequently the severity) of SMA
to be expected in the child. The severity of SMA already diagnosed
within the family is sometimes used by genetic counsellors as a
‘rough guide’ as to the likely severity of SMA likely in future gen-
erations. However, there are many instances of different ‘types’ of
SMA being diagnosed within one family that have been reported in
the clinical literature, e.g. Dubowitz (1991), as well as within the
sample of participants in this study. As Raspberry et al. (2011)
acknowledge, prenatal testing decisions are highly contingent on
the speciﬁcs of the condition being tested for, with conditions
involving early infantile death (e.g. Tay Sachs) resulting in very
different attitudes and decisions than prenatal testing for relatively
milder impairments e.g. hereditary deafness (p. 997). However,
SMA has been described as a neurological condition with a vast
variability in symptom expression (Dubowitz, 1991) and can pre-
sent anywhere in the spectrum from a terminal condition in infancy
to a relatively mild adult-onset impairment. This variability,
together with the inability of prenatal testing technologies to
accurately predict where on this spectrum a future child’s SMAwill
lie, makes decisions around prenatal testing particularly fraught
and heightens the associated social and ethical dilemmas, of which
the EO is one.4. Methods
Interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2009 with sixty-
one participants who all had at least one person (living or
deceased) diagnosed with SMA in their family. Participants were
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played in reproductive decision-making and attitudes towards
having children with SMA (Boardman, 2010). Firstly, participants’
stories of life with SMA were elicited before the interviews moved
on to a discussion of views around, and uses of, reproductive
technologies. Family members with differing levels of proximity to
the diagnosed person (e.g. parent, sibling, grandparent) were
included to allow an analysis of different types of experience with
SMA and their impact on reproductive decision making (Table 1).
Participants were recruited into the study through the main
advocacy group for SMA in the UK, the Jennifer Trust for Spinal
Muscular Atrophy (JTSMA, 2011). Recruitment occurred through a
variety of channels: through the JTSMA annual conference (n¼ 16),
through advertisements placed in their publications (n ¼ 16), per-
sonal contacts (n¼ 3) and snowball sampling (n¼ 22). Recruitment
was also attempted outside the JTSMA, through disability organi-
sations (Motability and DaDa) as well as personal websites set up
and run by families, however, these methods only led to the suc-
cessful recruitment of four participants. Participants were provided
with an information leaﬂet outlining the aims of the research and
the nature of the interview before being asked to participate and
were asked to sign a consent form prior to the interview. Ethical
approval for the research was granted by The University of War-
wick’s Research Ethics Committee.
As the participants were geographically dispersed within the
UK, interviewing took place through a variety of channels: over the
telephone (75%), via email (17%) and face-to-face (8%). Telephone
and face-to-face interviews lasted on average for one hour and ten
minutes, whereas email interviews took place over periods lasting
from three weeks to eight months. The method of interviewing
employed was determined primarily by participant preference, but
also took into account their geographical location and the con-
straints of the research budget. The ethical considerations associ-
ated with using these different interview techniques (particularly
in the context of being a researcher with a visible disability) are
discussed elsewhere (Brown and Boardman, 2011).
Interviews were transcribed verbatim (with names and identi-
ﬁers removed or changed), and the text responses from the email
interviews were compiled into single documents for analysis. A
constructivist approach to grounded theory data analysis was used.
Initially, ‘open coding’ (Gibbs, 2007) of the data was carried out
which was largely descriptive, before hierarchical coding was un-
dertaken through the use of qualitative data analysis software,
Nvivo 7. A process of coding, reﬁnement of concepts (through data
interpretation), followed by re-coding and further sampling were
carried out over a period of eight months until ‘theoretical satu-
ration’ had occurred (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). While the EO to
prenatal testing and selective termination was not speciﬁcally
asked about within the interview schedule, it emerged spontane-
ously in 41 (67%) of the participants’ accounts (see Table 2). All data
pertaining to the EO were coded together during analysis, and it is
the analysis of these data (41 transcripts) that is presented in this
paper. The participants whose voices are quoted within this paperTable 2
Type of SMA in family and gender of those mentioning the EO n ¼ 41.
Participants Type I Type II Type III Female Male
Diagnosed with SMA 1 12 6 17 2
Sibling of person with SMA, without
SMA themselves
1 3 1 3 2
Parent of person diagnosed with SMA 7 7 2 14 2
Partner or spouse of person diagnosed
with SMA
0 1 0 0 1
Totals 9 23 9 34 7all opted to participate in a telephone interview (although the full
range of interview techniques e email, telephone and face-to-face
e were used within the sample of 41 participants included in this
analysis). Their accounts were selected for presentation as they
articulately encapsulate the key themes that emerged from the
analysis of the EO data (41 transcripts).
5. Results
5.1. The expressivist objection and reproductive decision-making
Within participants’ accounts of their views around reproduc-
tive decision-making, the EO was frequently mentioned in various
forms. For some participants, prenatal testing was described as a
form of ‘genocide’ (Hannah, diagnosed with Type I SMA) which
communicated very clear disparaging messages about the value of
people with SMA, while for others, expressivist concerns e though
considered valid and relevant e were conceptualised as an unfor-
tunate ‘by-product’ of processes that were ‘necessary’ in facilitating
the reproductive decision-making of families living with SMA
(Thomas, able-bodied sibling of Demi, diagnosedwith Type II SMA).
Moreover, the EO was most frequently referenced by those in-
dividuals who were either diagnosed with Type II SMA themselves,
or who had Type II SMA in their family, with 56% of the EO sample
belonging to this group (see Table 2 for information regarding the
Type of SMA affecting the EO sample). What was clear from all of
the interviews however, was that expressivist concerns around
prenatal testing took on a different character and role within
families living with an inheritable condition to those described in
the literature on the EO. Indeed, the accumulated wealth of expe-
riential knowledge about the condition within the family appeared
to alter the nature and content of the message sent by prenatal
testing in a fundamental way. It was common, for example, for
participants in this study to entirely align the identity of a (hypo-
thetical) foetus diagnosed with SMA with their existing family
member with SMA, somuch so that theywere often conceptualised
as the same person. Beth is the able-bodied sibling of Melissa, who
has SMA Type III. During her interview, Beth discussed her feelings
about undergoing prenatal testing for SMA during her pregnancy
with her daughter (now 18 months):
I thought long and hard about whether or not I wanted to have
the testing, and in the end I just thought, whywould youwant to
stop yourself from having another Melissa? You know, she’s
absolutely fantastic, she’s got such mental strength, you know
she’s intelligent, she’s bright, she’s got a fantastic person-
ality.she does have physical problems but there isn’t anything
else wrong with her and so in the end I decided it [prenatal
testing] wasn’t something I was really bothered about.. I’d be
perfectly happy having another Melissa!
While critics of the EO have been at pains to demonstrate the
way in which disability cannot be considered an ‘identity consti-
tuting’ feature e an observation that undermines the very logic of
the EO (Edwards, 2005; Baily, 2000) e within the accounts of
families living with SMA, the possibility of having another affected
family member could not be disentangled from their experiences
and knowledge of their current family member’s SMA. Even though
it was evident in Beth’s comments that she did not view her sister’s
identity entirely in terms of SMA and was keen to highlight all of
Melissa’s positive personality traits, the hypothetical foetus diag-
nosed with SMA that Beth referenced was nevertheless so closely
associated with Melissa that it became ‘another Melissa’, even be-
ing assumed to possess all of her personality traits. In spite of the
medical profession being unable to accurately predict the severity
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member’s SMAwas nevertheless conceptualised as the yardstick by
which future lives with SMA could be assessed. This was somuch so
that the (hypothetical) foetus diagnosed with SMA came to be
conceptualised as an exact replica of that family member
(Boardman, in press); the foetus became ‘another Melissa’ or
‘another David’ etc. As Cox (2003) has highlighted, for families
livingwith genetic conditions (unlikewomen undergoing antenatal
screening tests) the ‘unfavourable outcome’ in reproductive
decision-making, the ‘worst case scenario’ is not a depersonalised
notion of disability or disease- it is a member of the family. This
‘personalisation’ of genetic risk perceptions in relation to the family
member with SMA has implications for the way in which the
expressive potential of prenatal testing was understood and
responded to; when a hypothetical foetus with SMA is con-
ceptualised as an existing family member, then decisions sur-
rounding the selective termination of that foetus take on new
meanings, both for the person with SMA, and the prospective
parents.
Throughout the interviews, it was apparent that participants
were acutely aware of the possible ways their reproductive de-
cisions could be interpreted by others, and many described it as
impacting on the reproductive choices they felt able to justify.
When prospective parents from the general population face se-
lective termination decisions following a prenatal diagnosis of a
screened-for condition, they may manage this highly emotional
decision by reference to the intolerable suffering associated with
the condition being tested for, and thus invoke altruistic justiﬁca-
tions for termination of affected pregnancies (Kaplan, 1999). This
argument, however, proved more difﬁcult for some families living
with SMA to sustain, particularly if they had witnessed a family
member (or themselves) live a fulﬁlling and successful life in spite
of the difﬁculties associated with their SMA. Natalie is in her early
thirties and has Type II SMA. She described her competing sense of
responsibility to both adequately parent a child with SMA, but also
uphold the value of life with SMA, in the context of a society in
which it is devalued:
It’d be so hard if I had a child with SMA, because I genuinely
believe that an SMA child needs two able-bodied parents to do
all the care that they need.. and yet if I, of all people, had a
termination for SMA, I’d be sending completely the wrong
message about life with SMA, wouldn’t I? I mean I live with it
day in day out, so if I rejected a child with it, it’d be me saying..
(sigh) I just feel like I spend a lot of my life trying to say to people
that SMA’s not that bad you know, you can live with it, you can
have a normal life with it. so if I did that[termination], I would
feel like I was, I guess, de-valuing my life, in a way.. And not
only my life, but everyone’s life who’s got SMA. It’d be saying
‘yes this is the right thing to do for babies with SMA’, and people
might take that seriously, you know, because I should know!
[Original emphasis]
Natalie appeared to struggle to reconcile her concerns about
raising a child with SMA (while having SMA herself) with her
feelings about the need to afﬁrm the value of life with SMA, not
only for herself, but for all people living with the condition. For
Natalie, the responsibility to consider the expressivist potential of
prenatal testing and selective termination is heightened for people
who have SMA: her decision about whether to use the technologies
could be interpreted as an authoritative statement on what life is
like with SMA, and as a template of action for others to follow. This
sense of heightened responsibility for reproductive decisions in the
context of living with the condition being tested for is reﬂected in
the accounts of other disabled people considering reproduction(Barford, 2011; Atkinson, 2008), and points to the way in which
expressivist concerns can add a further layer of complexity to such
decisions, both for disabled people, and their family members,
leaving them trapped between competing concerns and re-
sponsibilities (Boardman, 2011, 2014). Some participants, however,
used strategies to actively negotiate these competing re-
sponsibilities within their reproductive decisions, and it is to the
accounts of these decisions that I shall now turn.
5.2. Negotiating the expressivist objection in reproductive decision-
making
While some participants described their felt sense of the EO
within their reproductive decision-making (particularly those who
described hypothetical or anticipated reproductive decisions),
other participants used strategies to actively manage the implica-
tions of the EO, for themselves and for their family members, when
accounting for their decisions. These strategies were most often
employed by participants describing reproductive decisions
already taken. Kate is in her late 30s and has a seven year old son,
Daniel, diagnosed with SMA Type II. Kate described her desire to
have another child, but also her unwillingness to ‘test and termi-
nate’, a process which she differentiated from Pre-Implantation
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), of which she was undergoing her third
cycle at the time of the interview. PGD involves the creation of
embryos through IVF technologies, with genetic testing undertaken
at the embryonic stage. Embryos affected by SMA are discarded,
with only unaffected embryos being transferred into the woman’s
uterus for gestation.
We always knewwewanted a second child. and we also knew
we couldn’t handle having another Daniel on our hands because
we just pour all our lives into looking after him and we couldn’t
do that with another one, with Daniel as well. But the only way
we could know that it wouldn’t happen again would be to um
test and terminate, and. I just didn’t think I could do it..it’d be
like getting rid of Daniel, that’s how I’d look at it. And how
would I explain that to him, you know, when he’s older? How
could I say that we got rid of your brother or sister because they
were like you? It would just be like saying.. well wiping him
away really. Saying he wasn’t really what we had wanted. So
whenwe couldn’t conceive naturally andwe had to go down the
route of IVF and the PGD anyway, well that was great because it
took away that issue for us. It wasn’t like we were terminating
for SMA anymore because it was out of our hands.the fertility
problems meant that we didn’t have to go down that route of
having to end a pregnancy affected like Daniel.
Kate’s account appears to mark a conceptual distinction be-
tween disposing of an affected embryo (in the case of PGD) and an
affected foetus ‘like Daniel’ in the case of prenatal testing (which
usually takes place between 10 and 15weeks of pregnancy for SMA,
depending on the technique used). Such prenatal testing and se-
lective termination, Kate believed, would have communicated a
negative message to Daniel about the value of his life. While PGD is
not positioned within the medical and scientiﬁc literature as an
infertility treatment (Franklin and Roberts, 2006), by presenting
her transition to using PGD not as a decision, but as something Kate
had to do in order to conceive, she emphasises her lack of real
choice in the process, and in doing so, eliminates the possibility of
Daniel later interpreting her actions as a rejection. By doing this,
Kate could navigate the complex terrain of the EO and maintain her
‘relational responsibilities’ to her son (Burgess and D’Agincourt-
Canning, 2001). While the existence of prenatal testing and PGD,
as well as critiques of the EO, are often justiﬁed by reference to the
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over and above the need to protect against the emotional harm
done by them (Edwards, 2005; Murphy, 2011), as Kate’s account
reveals, expressivist concerns, can, paradoxically, constrain the
reproductive agency of would-be parents by closing down partic-
ular reproductive options, or ways of accounting for them. Indeed,
for Kate, when taking into consideration the EO and the signiﬁcant
emotional impact her decision to test and terminate could have,
both for herself and her son, the ways she could present her
reproductive decision as responsible and also as upholding the
value of her son’s life, became severely limited. The only way Kate
could manage this complexity was to conceptually remove herself
as the decision-maker, and consequently absolve herself of the
responsibility for a decision associated with great emotional,
ethical and practical implications, whichever way it was taken.
While thus far, the data presented in this paper have been
derived from interviews with people living with Types II and III
SMA, for some families living with Type I SMA, and particularly
those who had experienced the premature death of a family
member, the expressive capacity of genetic technologies to prevent
the recurrence of SMA, while acknowledged, was presented as less
signiﬁcant in the context of reproduction. Fraser is in his ﬁfties and
experienced the deaths of his ﬁrst two children, Ciaran and Eve, to
SMA Type I before their ﬁrst birthdays. He described his feelings
about the use of prenatal testing and selective termination to
ensure that his third child did not have SMA by contrasting it with
the decisions facing families affected by Type II SMA:
I think that if you’ve got Type II then there’s a big dilemma in the
family. If you’ve got a Type II that’s ten years old and you’re
expecting again, you know I’ve heard Type IIs say ‘would you
have gotten rid of me then if you’d had the chance?’, you know?
It’s different when it’s Type II in the family because.they live.
They can lead perfectly full, happy lives.which was just not
going to be the case for my children. Ciaran and Eve both suf-
fered and died..I don’t think anyone could see a dilemma for
wanting to stop that. No one could say to me that if I did [pre-
natal testing and selective termination] that I didn’t love and
want my children to live because they had SMA. No, of course I
did..but the fact is that they weren’t going to live, so yes,
although I wanted Ciaran and Eve, I also wanted rid of
the.horror of what happened to them.and not go through
that again. I don’t see that anyone could take issue with that.
not even a Type II.
Fraser’s comments strike at the heart of one of the major criti-
cisms that has been levelled at the EO: namely, its inconsistent
applicability. As Shakespeare (2006) has argued, there are often
certain circumstances in which disability rights supporters ‘waive’
their objection to prenatal testing, with the severity of the condi-
tion affecting the foetus being one such circumstance (p. 93).
Fraser’s conceptual distinction between Type II SMA, which, as he
points out, can be livedwith successfully, and Type I SMAwhich, for
his children, involved grievous suffering and premature death,
highlights the point towhich Shakespeare (2006) refers. Indeed the
lack of evidence for the EO in Barlevy et al. (2012)’s study of families
living with QT Syndrome (a potentially fatal condition involving
cardiac arrhythmia) suggests that EO concerns may have less
resonancewithin families where the condition to be inherited is- or
is at least potentially- fatal. Prenatal testing technologies are
currently unable to accurately distinguish between different types
of SMA in the foetus, making reproductive decisions particularly
fraught, given the vast spectrum of severities associated with the
condition. However, Fraser’s presentation of the certainty of his
future children having Type I SMA (and the undisputed sufferingthat Type I entails) enabled him to circumvent the reproductive
‘dilemma’ that faced him- the management of the EO- and conse-
quently justify his decision to use prenatal testing and selective
termination.
6. Discussion
This paper has presented some of the key ways in which the EO
was experienced and negotiated within families living with SMA.
While bioethicists have been amongst those to highlight some of
the theoretical ﬂaws within such an objection (Shakespeare, 2006;
Edwards, 2004; Malek, 2010), by drawing on the experiences of
those with SMA in their family, this paper has highlighted that the
emotional consequences of the EO are, nevertheless, a signiﬁcant
mediator in the reproductive decision-making of such families, and
that they may also constrain the ways that prospective parents are
able to present and justify their reproductive decisions.
As Cox (2003) has shown in relation to Huntingdon Disease,
families are arenas in which reproductive decisions come to be
scrutinised, and within which there may exist multiple, and
potentially competing, sites of accountability for decisions taken.
We make reproductive decisions not as autonomous individuals
Cox argues, but as the ‘mothers and daughters, fathers and sons,
sisters, brothers, aunts, uncles, cousins, spouses, life partners and
friends’ of others; as social being we exist ‘in and through our social
and familial ties with others’ (Cox, 2003: 262). It is in this familial
context that prenatal testing and selective termination practices
take on particular meanings; meanings that are augmented by the
family’s history with the condition, where the notion of having a
child with SMA is not based in abstract imaginings or medical in-
formation, but instead in the lived reality of family life.
Unlike women approaching antenatal screening decisions, for
families living alongside an inheritable condition like SMA, the
experiential and intimate nature of their knowledge about the
condition being tested for fundamentally alters the message
conveyed by testing and selection procedures- by aligning future
lives with existing family members with SMA. Within families,
wherein people with SMA are linked to other (potential) people
with SMA, not solely through their shared SMN1 deletion, but also
through blood ties, theway inwhich biological kinship relations are
conceptualised may become re-conﬁgured (Featherstone et al.,
2006). As has been demonstrated, SMA became conceptualised as
being synonymous with the family member diagnosed with it,
meaning that reproductive decisions become transformed from
decisions about life with SMA into highly personal appraisals of the
quality and nature of that individual’s life and experiences. For
those diagnosed with SMA, the emotional consequences of this
alignment were signiﬁcant: the decision of a family member to
terminate a pregnancy affected by SMA was often interpreted as a
devaluation of their own life, with this judgement being more
acutely felt if that family member had had had extensive involve-
ment and was considered to have ‘authentic’ insight into what life
is really like with SMA (Boardman, 2011). Indeed, participants
frequently spoke in terms of their ‘relational responsibilities’ (Cox,
2003); to prevent emotional harm to their family member with
SMA, as well as to other people living with it. For some, the
emotional risks and potential harms to relationships were so great,
that they described forgoing particular reproductive options (usu-
ally termination of pregnancy affected by SMA), highlighting the
potential of expressivist concerns to constrain reproductive de-
cisions for such families.
While someparticipantswere able to navigate the implications of
the EO and still present their decisions as responsible, for example by
conceptually removing themselves as the decision-maker when
recounting decisions (Kate), or by using experiential knowledge of
F.K. Boardman / Social Science & Medicine 107 (2014) 18e2524SMA to highlight the certain intolerability of suffering in future lives
(Fraser), that these participants nevertheless presented their de-
cisions in terms of the EO highlights its signiﬁcance as a mediator of
their reproductive decision-making. Indeed, despite theemphasis on
informed decision-making, rational choice and patient autonomy
which currently preside over clinical practice in the ﬁelds of genetic
medicine and beyond, this research, in line with other studies, calls
into question individualised notions of agency in the context of
reproductive decision-making and underlines the importance of
understanding the way that relational responsibilities shape repro-
ductive decisions (Burgess and D’Agincourt, 2001; Hallowell et al.,
2003). An emphasis on rational, calculated reproductive decision-
making, both in genetic counselling, as well as within debates
around the EO (e.g. Malek, 2010) overlooks what Fischhoff et al.
(1978) refer to as the ‘human factor’ in decision-making: namely,
the highly emotive relationship individuals have with their history
with a condition, their relationships to family members and signiﬁ-
cant others, as well as wider social discourses around disability, ge-
netic disease and parental responsibility. Thus, while the theoretical
coherence of the EO may indeed be imperfect, its emotional re-
verberations throughout families living with genetic disease were
nevertheless profound. Even for those participants who rejected the
notion that EO concerns could justiﬁably bemade in relation to their
own reproductive decisions (e.g. Fraser), these participants never-
theless framedandvalidated their reproductivedecisionbyreference
to the EO (‘No one could say to me that if I did [prenatal testing and
selective termination] that I didn’t love and want my children to live
because they had SMA’- Fraser), highlighting the perceived need to be
accountable to the EO, even by those who rejected it.
The ﬁndings of this research have a contribution to make to the
call, made primarily by disability rights supporters, for more
knowledge about the conditions that are currently screened and
tested for to be made available to would-be parents approaching
testing decisions (Fletcher, 2002; Patterson and Satz, 2002). Such
disability rights supporters are keen to highlight that experiences
of disability within families are often more positive than might be
supposed by the medical professionals who counsel couples (Asch,
2000), as well as the general public. The implicit assumption of this
argument is that access to experiential knowledge might challenge
prevailing attitudes to disability (and consequently their antici-
pated role in selective termination decisions). This research, how-
ever, has highlighted the tangible effects such direct experiential
knowledge can have on the way in which the EO is formulated, felt
and experienced, within the context of families living with genetic
disease. For the participants in this study, having knowledge of
what life with SMA was ‘really’ like heightened the emotional
distress associated with the EO, and invalidated the emotional
‘buffer’ that may be used by people living with conditions that are
routinely screened for in the general population (e.g. Spina Biﬁda,
Down’s Syndrome) : the idea that such screening and selective
termination decisions are made in the context of ignorance, or even
prejudiced ideas, about the reality of that particular condition.
Indeed, for families living with inheritable diseases such as SMA,
these decisions around selective termination were not being made
by unknown others, but by members of their own family.
This ﬁnding thus highlights the need to carefully consider the
support needs of disabled people living with tested-for conditions
in the context of increasing genetic testing, and echoes Peterson’s
(2012) call for an engagement of the genetic counselling commu-
nity with the EO. It may be useful for genetic counsellors to explore
conceptualisations and experiences of the EO when counselling
families affected by genetic disease where appropriate, and
importantly, the experiences of those diagnosed with the condition
themselves. Such an exploration may help counsellors identify
those individuals most likely to experience distress in the prenatalor carrier testing counselling process and who might beneﬁt from
additional support (Etchegary et al., 2008: 123).Acknowledgements
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